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I. INTRODUCTION
Conservation easements are negative restrictions that
impose limitations on the owner of burdened land for conservation
purposes.I Landowners, government entities, and non-profit
organizations create conservation easements for a variety of
purposes that may include preservation of ecological, natural,
2
open, or scenic features. Conservation easements have unique
characteristics distinct from common law servitudes. Conservation
easements are statutorily created, negative easements in gross.' In
other words, a conservation easement creates a particular right in
its holder to restrict burdened land from being used in a certain
way and allows this restriction to run with the land. This
characterization is distinct from common law easements, which are
traditionally affirmative, and when in gross, are neither
transferable nor assignable.
State enabling statutes define conservation easements and
describe their scope and applicability. In 1981, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") created the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
("UCEA") for the purpose of enabling "durable restrictions and
affirmative obligations to be attached to real property to protect
natural and historic resources."4  The UCEA allows for the
creation, conveyance, recording, assignment, release, modification,
and termination of conservation easements in the same manner as
traditional easements.5  The NCCUSL chose to characterize
conservation easements this way for a number of reasons,
including; legal professionals' familiarity with easement law and
the current absence of traditional limitations once imposed on
easement doctrine.6 Of the states that have not adopted the specific
language of the UCEA language, many states have statutes with
'See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1) (1981).
2
3 Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis
in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REv. 433,
435-437 (1984).
4 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT Prefatory Note (1981).
Id. § 2(a).
6 Id Prefatory Note.
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similar provisions to the UCEA,7 while a few states treat
conservation easements in a unique fashion.8
In addition to equating the treatment of conservation
easements to common law easements for purposes of creation,
modification and termination, the UCEA provides for the enacting
jurisdiction to modify or invalidate conservation easements in
accordance with its principles of law and equity.9 When these two
provisions are read together, the UCEA and adopting jurisdictions
allow for modification and termination of conservation easements
in accordance with the enacting jurisdiction's easement law.
Currently, a little fewer than half of all jurisdictions incorporate
both provisions in their enabling statute.10
Jurisdictions allow for termination and modification in
various ways depending on language incorporated in its statute.
While some jurisdictions provide language allowing for
termination and modification based on easement law, a number of
states provide different statutory language. Some jurisdictions
allow for modification and termination of conservation easements
through a public hearing process," while other jurisdictions
specifically allow for application of common law doctrines to
modify and extinguish conservation easements.12 Additionally, a
large number of jurisdictions fail to address the issue completely.' 3
A lingering and unsettled question regarding conservation
easements is how courts should remedy a perpetual conservation
easement that no longer serves the purpose for which it was
originally created. In response to this issue, many scholars debate
what remedy should apply to account for the viable use of land for
future generations. Of the doctrines applied to terminate
7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.5-107 (West 2010) (stating that
conservation easements may, "[I]n whole or in part, be released, terminated,
extinguished, or abandoned by merger with the underlying fee interest in the
servient land or water rights or in any other manner in which easements may be
lawfully terminated, released, extinguished, or abandoned").
8 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-118 (West 2010) (a conservation
easement is, "in the form of an easement, covenant, restriction, or condition").
9 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3(b) (1981).
10 See infra note 104.
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184 §§ 31-32 (West 2010).
12 See infra note 106.
" ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-404 (2010).
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traditional easements, the doctrine of changed conditions is the
most significant grounds for termination of conservation
easements.14 Although some jurisdictions allow for application of
the doctrine, termination based on changed conditions may pose a
"problematic" issue, according to the NCCUSL in the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act ("UCEA").15
This paper examines how state statutes address the issue of
modification and termination of conservation easements and the
doctrine of changed conditions. This analysis is achieved by: (1)
examining a comprehensive statute that incorporates the doctrine
of changed conditions and (2) examining a statute that provides
little guidance regarding the treatment of outmoded conservation
easements.
Conservation easements can perpetually restrain the use of
property for future generations and, absent specific statutory or
decisional law within a jurisdiction, may inadequately address the
issue of change. Although some jurisdictions provide adequate
remedies, many jurisdictions lack sufficient statutory language or
decisional law that deal with this concern. For this reason, an
enabling statute that provides for application of the doctrine of
changed conditions with a sufficiently strict standard, while also
reserving the rights of parties to provide their own modification
and termination language within the conservation easement
instrument, provides a benefit to future generations as well as
current conservation easement holders.
II. THE NATURE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
An easement is "an interest in land owned by another
person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area
above or below it, for a specific limited purpose."16 An easement
creates two distinct property interests: a "dominant estate" that has
the right to use land of another, and the "servient estate" that
14 See generally Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the
Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1989).
15 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3(b) (1981).
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (8th ed. 2005).
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allows the exercise of that use.' 7 Easements are either appurtenant
or in gross. Easements appurtenant are those in which there is a
right to use the servient estate for the benefit of the dominant
estate. An easement in gross is defined as, "An easement
benefiting a particular person and not a particular piece of land."' 9
In addition, common law easements are either affirmative
or negative. Affirmative easements confer a privilege to a person
to use the land of another. 20 Negative easements confer a right on
the dominant estate owner to restrict the land from being used in
21certain ways by the servient owner. Common law recognized
only four negative easements that included light, air, view, support
of buildings, and stream flow, none of which included preservation
of the natural resources or open and scenic characteristics of
land.22
Conservation easements are negative restrictions that
impose limitations on the owner of burdened land for the purpose
of preserving its ecological, natural, open, or scenic features.23
Conservation easements are "an outgrowth of three distinct
common law devices that enable their owner or beneficiary to
control the use of property owned by another: easements, real
covenants, and equitable servitudes." 24  Conservation easements
are distinct from easements in a number of ways.25 Traditionally
under the common law, easements were affirmative interests,
whereas negative interests were either "covenants" or "equitable
servitudes."26 In addition to being negative, conservation
easements are also in gross. Historically, easements in gross are
1 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 1 (2004).
18 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements Appurtenant § 8 (2004)
19 BLACK'S supra note 16, at 432.
20
21 Id. at 433.
22 GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL
COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 1-4 (2d ed. 2004).
23 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1).
24 John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land
Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 325-326 (1997).
25 See Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land
Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1052 (2007).
26 d
2010-2011]1 271
272 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
not transferable or assignable. However, most states adopted
statutory language modifying this limitation.27
Additionally, conservation easements are created by statute.
Currently, at least 49 states, as well as the District of Columbia,
have enabling statutes in place allowing for the creation of
conservation easements.28 The enabling statutes define the
attributes, scope and treatment of conservation easements within
the governing jurisdiction.29
Although each state's conservation easement statute varies
in its reach and application, the main features of the statutes can be
seen in the UCEA. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
addressed the issue of whether conservation easements should be
treated as easements or another property interest in the
Commissioner's Prefatory Note of the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act, stating:
The easement alternative is favored in the
Act for three reasons. First, lawyers and
courts are most comfortable with easements
and easement doctrine, less so with
restrictive covenants and equitable
servitudes, and can be expected to
experience severe confusion if the Act opts
for a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the
easement is the basic less-than-fee interest at
common law; the restrictive covenant and
the equitable servitude appeared only
because of the then-current, but now
outdated, limitations of easement doctrine.
Finally, non-possessory interests satisfying
27 Hollingshead, supra note 25, at 328-335. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 2-118(c) (West 2010) ("If the restriction is not granted for the benefit of
any dominant tract of land, it is enforceable with respect to the servient land,
both at law and in equity, as an easement in gross, and as such it is inheritable
and assignable.").
28 Nancy McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation
Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 426 n.13 (2005).
29 C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Downd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 Wyo. L.
Rev. 25, 35 (2008).
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
the requirements of covenant real or
equitable servitude doctrine will invariably
meet the Act's less demanding requirements
as "easements." Hence, the Act's easement
orientation should not prove prejudicial to
instruments drafted as real covenants or
equitable servitudes, although the converse
would not be true.30
Although conservation easements have a unique statutory
nature, the NCCUSL sought to retain the common law of
easements of the adopting jurisdiction as a frame of reference for
conservation easements. Further, section two of the UCEA states,
"a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded,
assigned, released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or
affected in the same manner as other easements,"3' allowing for
the treatment of conservation easements in the same fashion as
traditional easements.
Conservation easements, therefore, do not fit into any well-
defined category of property law. They are creatures of statute, yet
their treatment within many state statutes and the UCEA allow for
creation, conveyance, recording, assignment, release, termination
and modification in the same manner as easements. Depending on
the language in a jurisdiction's statute, certain common law rules
applied to traditional easements may defeat a conservation
easement that no longer serves the purpose for which it was
created.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF CHANGED CONDITION
The common law doctrine of changed conditions stands for
the proposition that a court may terminate a servitude on a property
when, "changed conditions in and around the property have
frustrated the servitude's purpose or created an undue hardship on
the owner of the land." 32 Parties raise the doctrine as a defense to
30 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT Prefatory Note (1981).
31 Id. at § 2.
32 fBlackie, supra note 14, at 1188.
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an injunctive action for violation of a restriction or raise it
affirmatively in seeking declaratory judgment that a restriction is
no longer enforceable. 33 Application of the doctrine involves two
conflicting interests. The party enforcing the restriction has a right
to rely on the restrictions, while the change in and around the
property may cause the restriction to be inequitable for the
challenging party. 34
The doctrine may be based on two principles: the implied
intent of the parties and public policy.35  When parties create
servitudes, they most likely understand that changes in conditions
may cause the servitude to lose the benefit for which it was
created.36 From a public policy perspective, allowing servitudes to
continue even after their purpose has been frustrated reduces land
values and, "turns the law into an instrument of extortion," where
the servitude holder can charge an unreasonably high price for
release of the restriction that may have little or no value.37
Courts generally apply a stringent test to determine if the
doctrine of changed conditions will terminate a restriction on land.
Generally, application of the doctrine is successful only if the
purpose for which the servitude was created can no longer be
accomplished. 38 Additionally, courts cautiously apply the doctrine
because courts regard property interests as valuable. 39
Although closely associated with abandonment and the
relative-hardship doctrines, the changed conditions doctrine is
distinct. Abandonment, or "[lt]he relinquishing of a right or interest
with the intention of never again claiming it" 40 requires a finding
of an intention of relinquishing a right or interest, whereas the
doctrine of changed conditions does not. On the other hand, the
doctrine of changed conditions is used when, "even though a
33 Id. at 1206.






40 BLACK'S supra note 16, at 2.
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servitude no longer serves its intended purpose, the beneficiary
does not intend to abandon it."4 1
The doctrine of relative hardship stands for the proposition
that, "[i]njunctive relief against violation of the obligation arising
out of a promise respecting the use of land will be denied if the
harm done by granting the injunction will be disproportionate to
the benefit secured thereby." 42 Although similar to the doctrine of
changed conditions, the doctrine of relative hardship balances the
burden of the landowner and the benefit to the holder of the
restriction, while the doctrine of changed conditions relies on the
implied intent of the parties.43  However, some legal scholars
regard the doctrine of changed conditions as essentially a
reformulation of the relative hardship doctrine. 44
Although there is no clear rule in determining whether a
significant change has occurred in order for the doctrine to apply,
courts consider, "the intent of the parties, the foreseeability of the
change in conditions, the benefit to the servitude holder, and the
duration of the restriction."45 In analyzing these factors, courts
normally consider whether the servitude can continue to serve the
original purpose for which it was created, rather than the effect of
the change on the value of the burdened land.46
When courts examine the implied intent of the parties, they
determine whether the original intent of the parties can be carried
out despite changed conditions.47 Rather than determine what the
parties would do currently, courts assess, "whether the . . .
restrictions remain substantially capable of serving purposes
intended when the restrictions were imposed."4 8  Courts also
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 7.10 cmt. b (2000).
42 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 563 (1944).
43 Blackie, supra note 14,at 141.
44 d.
45 Id. at 1209. See, e.g, AC Assocs. v. First Nat'1 Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121
(Fla. 1984) (in which the court determined the implied intent of the servitude
holder).
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.§ 7.10. See, e.g., South Shore Homes Ass'n,
Inc. v. Holland Holiday's, 219 Kan. 744 (1976) (finding that a change in
conditions must be so great as to destroy its purpose).
47 Blackie, supra note 14, at 1209.
48 AC Assocs. v. First Nat'l Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984). See Blackie, supra note 14, at 1209-10.
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consider the location of the changed conditions in relation to the
restricted land. When a change occurs to the land surrounding the
restricted land, a court is less likely to allow for application of the
doctrine than when a change occurs to the restricted land.49
Another factor considered by courts is the duration of the
restriction. Generally, courts are more likely to apply the doctrine
of changed conditions to defeat restrictions of longer duration.50
Courts find that the longer the duration of the restriction, the less
likely it is to comply with the best use of the land.'
An illustrative and typical example of a successful
affirmative application of the doctrine can be found in Wolff v.
Fallon.52 In Wolff the plaintiff purchased a lot containing certain
common subdivision restrictions specifying the minimum cost,
location of the building, and a restriction limiting the lot use as a
private dwelling.53 The plaintiffs lot bordered an unrestricted lot
within the subdivision set aside for commercial development. 54 In
arguing for application of the doctrine of changed conditions to
defeat the restrictions, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the
town zoned lots along the street (including the plaintiffs lot) as a
commercial district and that the street adjoining the plaintiffs lot
had an increase in commercial vehicles. In addition, the plaintiff
introduced testimony by a real estate broker that the lot was no
longer suitable for residential purposes. In applying the doctrine
of changed conditions in reliance on the evidence, the trial court
granted (and the Supreme Court of California affirmed) declaratory
relief removing the restrictions from the lot.56 In applying the
doctrine of changed conditions, the court considered both the size





51 d. at 1212.







Similarly, homeowners raised the doctrine as a defense to
an injunctive action for violation of a property restriction in
Sandstrom v. Larsen.58 In Sandstrom, plaintiffs sought an
injunction against homeowners in a subdivision for violation of a
restrictive height covenant on their property. In defense to the
action, the homeowners raised a theory of changed conditions
asserting that a thirteen-story condominium building close to the
subdivision, obstructing their view, necessitated application of the
doctrine.59 The court ultimately rejected the landowner's
argument, finding that the obstruction of the landowner's view was
not so great as to allow for application of the doctrine of changed
conditions. 60 The court described the standard for application of
the doctrine, stating, "the change in conditions must be so great or
radical as to neutralize the benefits of the restriction and destroy its
purpose."61 In rejecting the landowner's argument, the court ruled
that if the benefits of the original restriction were still realized,
application of the doctrine of changed conditions was inapplicable
to defeat the restriction on the property.62
As these cases suggest, the doctrine of changed conditions
is an effective remedy that allows for efficient use of land. In the
words of one court, the doctrine, "operates to prevent the
perpetuation of inequitable and oppressive restrictions on land use
and development that would merely harass or injure one party
without benefiting the other." 63  Courts typically apply a
sufficiently strict standard in considering application of the
doctrine of changed conditions and are generally cautious in
allowing the doctrine to defeat valuable interests in land.
58 Sandstrom v. Larsen, 583 P.2d 971 (Haw. 1978).
59 Id. at 977.
60 d
61 Id. (quoting South Shore Homes Association, Inc. v. Holland
Holiday's, 549 P.2d 1035, 1044 (Kan. 1976)).
62 Id.
6, Cortese v. United States, 782 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1986).
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A. The Doctrine of Changed Condition and its
Application to Easements
The doctrine of changed conditions arose as a defense to an
action seeking to enforce an equitable servitude.64 Traditionally,
courts applied the doctrine in cases involving real covenants 65 and
equitable servitudes 66 and not easements. 67 This is because courts
historically viewed easements as distinct and valuable property
rights, while treating real covenants with suspicion, subjecting
them to greater hurdles against enforcement. 68
However, a close examination of pertinent law shows that
the doctrine is, in fact, applicable to easements. 69  Courts
traditionally terminated outdated easements either by "a liberal
application of the abandonment principle, or by finding that the
purpose of the easement has become impossible to accomplish, or
that the easement no longer serves its intended purpose, rather than
by the changed-conditions doctrine . . . .;" however, "similar
results should be reached under either formulation of the
concept."70  Further, commentators suggest that modern courts
may be more likely to apply the doctrine to terminate easements,
possibly due to the absence of traditional limitations once imposed
on easement doctrine. 7 1
Most states allow for application of the doctrine of changed
conditions to terminate real covenants and equitable servitudes, but
64 Blackie, supra note 14, at 1206.
65 A real covenant is, "A covenant that, because it relates to the land, binds
successor grantees indefinitely." BLACK'S supra note 16, at 313.
66 An equitable servitude is, "A private agreement . . . that restricts the use or
occupancy of real property" BLACK'S supra note 16, at 430.
67 Blackie, supra note 14, at 1213.
6' Korngold, supra note 3, at 436; see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP, § 450(b)
& comment h (1944); Curtis J. Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of
Servitudes 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1330 (1982) (stating, "courts traditionally
accord greater deference to easement rights than rights which derive from
covenants and servitudes.").
69 See Korngold, supra note 3, at 483; see, e.g., AKG Real Estate v. Kosterman,
No. 04-0188, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 883, at *23-*25 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 3,
2004).
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP, § 7.10 Reporter's Note (2000).
71 See Blackie supra note 14, at 1214.
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fewer states allow for application of the doctrine to terminate
easements.72 However, a number of states have case law allowing
for application of the doctrine of changed conditions to terminate
easements. 73  For example, in Hopkins the Florist, Inc. v.
Fleming,74 plaintiff landowner sought declaratory relief through a
denial of defendant's easement of view over plaintiffs land. The
easement stated that no obstacle on the plaintiffs land could
obstruct the southern view of the street from the defendant's house.
The plaintiff argued that because the defendant moved his house
there was no longer a southerly view of the street from any of its
windows, causing the easement to be extinguished. Although the
court did not invoke the doctrine of changed conditions by name, it
relied upon a standard in which, "[a] substantial change in the
dominant estate may result in the extinguishment of an easement of
light and air as where the building to which such an easement is
appurtenant has ceased to exist." 76  The court examined the
language of the easement, finding that the parties intended to
create, "an easement appurtenant only to the house then standing
on the . .. [defendant's] property, and that when that house was
permanently removed to a location where . . . there is no southerly
view of Main Street from any of its windows, the easement was
extinguished." 77 Because the language of the easement required
that no building on the plaintiff s property obstruct the defendant's
view, defendant's act of moving his residence frustrated the
original purpose of the easement. In this case, the court applied the
72 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, supra note 30.
73 See, e.g., Inhabitants of Town of Sabattus v. Bilodeau, 391 A. 2d 357 (Me
1978) (court terminated easement to draw water for fire-protection because
dominanet estate made little or no use of servitude and had alternative water
source); Hahn v. Baker Lodge, No. 47, A.F. & A.M., 21 Or. 30, 31, 27 P. 166
(1891) (court terminated plaintiffs easement through a building when ingress
and egress became impossible after a fire destroyed the building); American Oil
Co. v. Leaman, 101 S.E.2d 540 (Va. 1958) (easement for access to public
highway terminated after highway was closed); McCreery v. Chesapeake Corp.,
257 S.E.2d 828 (Va. 1979) (easement reserved for access to county road
terminated when county road was closed.)
74 26 A.2d 96 (Vt. 1942).
7 Id. at 97.
76 Id. at 98.
77 Id. at 99.
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doctrine of changed conditions to invalidate a restriction that no
longer served the purpose for which it was originally created,
thereby allowing for efficient use of the land.
B. The Doctrine's Application to Conservation
Easements
State conservation easement statutes are relatively new and
widespread use of these easements date only from the 1970s.
Additionally, there are no opinions in which a court applied the
doctrine of changed conditions to terminate conservation
easements. However, some legal scholars argue that the doctrine is
applicable. 79 As one commentator noted, "[lt]he combination of the
doctrine of changed conditions and the preservation-appropriate
requirements in conservation easement statutes may provide fertile
ground for arguments to invalidate easements when plaintiffs ...
can convince a court that the easement no longer serves a purpose
the legislature contemplated."80  If applied successfully to
terminate conservation easements, the doctrine could provide a
remedy to remove a conservation easement or could be used as a
defense in an enforcement proceeding for breach of the
conservation easement.8 1 When applied with the strict standard by
which courts determine whether to invalidate an easement, the
doctrine of changed conditions may provide an effective remedy to
allow for the efficient use of land. A conservation easement would
then become obsolete because it no longer serves the purpose for
which it was created.
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 7.11, Reporter's Note (2000).
79 See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private
Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the
Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1077 (2007) (stating that
the doctrine is applicable to terminate conservation easements, but would not be
an easy case to make because proponents of the easement may argue that open
space is necessary when surrounding conditions worsen).
s0 Frederic Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts
and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DEN.
U. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (1996).
si Blackie, supra note 14, at 1188.
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Scholars offer a number of scenarios in which the doctrine
of changed conditions may apply. For example, a landowner may
invoke the doctrine when development or pollution cause a
conservation easement for the protection of a particular species to
no longer accomplish its purpose.82 Another situation in which the
doctrine may apply is when a particular species of tree protected
by a conservation easement is destroyed and fails to re-grow.83 As
these examples show, narrowly stated purpose statements in
conservation easements may cause conservation easements to be
more susceptible to termination based on application of the
doctrine.84
The Restatement (Third) of Property may provide some
insight into the application of the doctrine of changed conditions to
conservation easements, stating, "[i]f the servitude can no longer
be used to accomplish any conservation purpose, it may be
terminated . . . . The Restatement further describes the
difference in application of the doctrine to conservation easements,
stating that, while termination of an easement normally doesn't
entitle the landowner to damages, the termination of a conservation
easement does. 86 The Restatement also provides that, as with the
doctrine's application to easements, "[c]hanges in the value of the
servient estate for development purposes are not changed
conditions that permit modification or termination of a
conservation servitude." 87
The UCEA and several states' statutes that have
incorporated similar language leave open the possibility of
application of the doctrine of changed conditions through a number
of provisions." Section 3(b) of the UCEA states that the, "Act
82 Korngold, supra note 25, at 1077.
8, Id.
84 d.
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. §7.11(2) (2000).
86 See Id. and cmt. c.
8 Id. § 7.11(4).
88 See, e.g. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.5-107 (West 2010) (Colorado)
(stating that conservation easements may, "in whole or in part, be released,
terminated, extinguished, or abandoned by merger with the underlying fee
interest in the servient land or water rights or in any other manner in which
easements may be lawfully terminated, released, extinguished, or abandoned").
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does not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a
conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law
and equity." 89  Further, the UCEA provides for release,
modification and termination, "in the same manner as other
easements." 90 In the comments to section three, the NCCUSL
describe their rationale for this provision in stating that the Act,
"leaves intact the existing case and statute law of adopting states as
it relates to the modification and termination of easements . . . ."
but also state that, "the doctrine [of changed conditions] is
applicable to real covenants and equitable servitudes in all states,
but its application to easements is problematic in many states." 91
Reading these provisions and comments together, the language of
the UCEA suggests that, "while the application of the doctrine is
left to the adopting jurisdiction, the applicable law is the
jurisdiction's law of easements, not the law of covenants and
equitable servitudes." 92
Although there are no cases involving the application of the
doctrine of changed conditions to terminate a conservation
easement, a few cases provide correlations for the doctrine's
application. One such case is Bates Manufacturing Company v.
Franklin Company.93 In Bates, the defendant, over eighty years
prior, conveyed to the plaintiffs predecessor in title a lot with a
restrictive covenant requiring that the lot be maintained as open
space. The restriction also reserved an easement for the defendant
to build a canal across the property. 94  Years later the parties
entered into an agreement to lease the property for use as a gas
station. As part of the lease agreement, the defendant property
owner waived his right to enforce the restrictions until the
termination of the lease. 95
One of the issues in this case was whether the restrictive
covenant was enforceable in light of commercial development in
89 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3(b) (1981).
90 Id. § 2(a).
91 Id. § 3(b).
92 Blackie, supra note 14, at 1196.
93 Bates MFG. Co. v. Franklin Co., 218 A.2d 366 (Me. 1966).
94 Id. at 366.
95 Id. at 367-68.
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the neighborhood. 96  The area surrounding the land contained
drive-in restaurants, service stations, branch banks and
supermarkets. 97 After considering the evidence, the court held that
the restriction remained valid despite development because of a
lack of evidence establishing a change in use of the lot in the entire
88 years of the lot's existence, including the years since the parties
created the lease agreement. Contrary to the defendant's
assertions, the evidence did not establish that "the change in the
character of the neighborhood in the immediate vicinity of the
restricted land ha[d] been so radical and permanent as to render
perpetuation of the restriction plainly unjust because its original
purpose can no longer be accomplished."98
Although application of the doctrine of changed conditions
to conservation easements remains an unsettled question, a more
thorough examination of state enabling acts provides insight into
the doctrine's applicability and treatment.
IV. STATE ENABLING STATUTES
As stated previously, at least 49 states and the District of
Columbia have statutes that define the scope and applicability of
conservation easements within each state. Creation of these
statutes arose out of recognition of increased public support for
private conservation efforts. 99 Each statute addresses the unique
needs of each state.100 As such, some state enabling statutes vary
regarding the issue of termination and modification.
Currently, more than half of all states (including the
District of Columbia) either explicitly incorporate the modification
and termination language from the UCEA, providing for
termination, "in accordance with the principles of law and
equity"101 or provide language similar to this provision. 102  Of




99 John Walliser, Conservation Servitudes, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
47, 117 (1997).
100 Id
'0 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3(b) (1981).
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those states that incorporate this language, most also incorporate
the UCEA provision providing for modification and termination,
"in the same manner as other easements." 103 Five state's statutes
provide for modification of conservation easements through
application of the doctrine of changed conditions.104 Two state's
statutes provide for a procedure for modification and termination
102 These states include: Alaska, Arizona (additionally directs that courts
consider public interest before modifying or amending), Arkansas, District of
Columbia, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland,
Pennsylvania (provides that the conservation easement be "broadly construed"
in determining whether the conservation easement is consistent with the public
policy of the Act), South Dakota, and Vermont.
103 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a). With the exception of
Louisiana (providing for modification and termination, "[I]n the same manner as
other servitudes created by contract." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1273(A) (2009)),
Maryland (providing for modification and termination, "[I]n the same manner as
an easement or servitude with respect to the water or land areas, or the
improvement or appurtenance thereto ... ." MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-
118(a) (West 2010)) and Vermont (providing only that, [s]uch a right or interest
shall be subject to the requirement of filing a notice of claim within the forty
year period provided by [the state's Marketable Record Title statute]." 27 VT.
STAT. ANN. Tit. 10, § 823 (2010)).
104 ALA. CODE § 35-18-3(b) (2009) ("This chapter does not affect the power of a
court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the
principles of law and equity applicable to other easements and specifically
including the doctrine of changed conditions."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 457A.2(1)
(West 2010) ("A conservation easement shall be perpetual unless expressly
limited to a lesser term, or unless released by the holder, or unless a change of
circumstances renders the easement no longer beneficial to the public."); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. 33 § 477(3)(B)("[A] conservation easement is limited in
duration unless ... Change of circumstances renders the easement no longer in
the public interest as determined by the court."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,114
(2009) ("The court may modify or terminate the easement pursuant to this
section only if the petitioner establishes that it is no longer in the public interest
to hold the easement or that the easement no longer substantially achieves the
conservation or preservation purpose for which it was created"); N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307 (McKinney 2010) (Providing that, if the terms of the
conservation easement do not provide for termination or amendment, a court
may apply the general real property law of New York, allowing for termination
in the event of changed conditions or impossibility.).
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after a public hearing. o0 Lastly, thirteen remaining states fail to
address the issue of amending or terminating conservation
easements. 106
States that incorporate the modification and termination
language from the UCEA provide language adopted from section
two of the Act. The pertinent part of the provision states "a
conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded,
assigned, released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or
affected in the same manner as other easements."10 7 Additionally,
states that adopt the UCEA language also have statutes that contain
a provision stating, "[t]his Act does not affect the power of a court
to modify or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with
the principles of law and equity."108 As this language suggests,
state law regarding modification and termination of easements
govern the treatment of conservation easements in the states that
have adopted this provision. Problems may arise, however, if the
state adopting this language does not have developed law in place
to address changed conditions.
To examine how certain state statutes incorporate
termination language, the next section examines two states:
Arkansas and New York. The Arkansas statute incorporates
language from the UCEA allowing for termination and
modification of easements in the same manner as other easements.
However, Arkansas law fails to provide a remedy for outmoded
easements. For this reason, the circumstances under which a
conservation easement is extinguishable when the purpose for
which it was created is no longer possible remains unclear. In
contrast, the New York conservation easement statute provides
specific language and circumstances under which a conservation
easement may be terminated and, through application of its general
real estate law, allows for application of the doctrine of changed
105 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184 §§ 32 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-
5 (West 2010).
106 Including California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island (only allows
release of "restriction" by "applicable statutes and regulations." R.I. GEN.LAWS
1956, § 34-39-5 (2009)), Tennesee, and Vermont.
107 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a).
1os Id. § 3(b).
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conditions. The New York law provides a sufficiently strict
standard for application of the doctrine to terminate servitudes in
the event of changed conditions and alternatively provides for
modification and termination as specified within the conservation
easement instrument.
A. The Arkansas Conservation Easement Statute
The Arkansas conservation easement presents what the
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws may deem a "problematic"
application for the doctrine of changed conditions as applied to
conservation easements.109 Although Arkansas' statute provides
for modification and termination in the same manner as traditional
easements, Arkansas decisional law does not provide a remedy for
terminating outmoded conservation easements. Further, although
the doctrine of changed conditions is applicable to terminate other
servitudes, including restrictive covenants, in Arkansas,
application of this doctrine to terminate easements is not available.
Arkansas' conservation easement statute incorporates
termination language from the UCEA, allowing for termination in
the same manner as other easements and reserving the power of a
court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in
accordance with principles of law and equity. 110 Therefore, the
Arkansas statute allows for termination and modification in
accordance with its law of easements.
In Arkansas, there are a few cases in which the doctrine of
changed conditions was raised, successfully or unsuccessfully, to
terminate restrictive covenants.''' For example, in Owens v.
Camfield,112 a landowner successfully invoked the doctrine of
changed conditions to terminate a restrictive covenant limiting use
of lots for residential purposes. 113 However, although Arkansas
law allows for application of the doctrine of changed conditions to
109 Id. at cmt. § 3.
110 Supra note 13.
... See, e.g., Mcguire v. Bell, 61 S.W.2d 904 (Ark. 1988) (The plaintiff
unsuccessfully attempted to invoke the doctrine to cancel a restrictive covenant
restricting the use of property to single-family residences)
112 614 S.W.2d 698 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981).
113 id
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terminate restrictive covenants, there is currently no case law in
which a court upheld application of the doctrine to terminate an
easement.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
Sluyter v. Hale Fireworks Partnership,114 explicitly rejected the
application of the doctrine of changed condition to easements. In
holding that condemnation of part of the plaintiffs' land did not
cause termination of a common driveway easement, the Court
rejected application of the doctrine stating, "even were we to
adopt, which we do not, the changed-conditions doctrine proposed
in Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.10 (2000), it
would not apply to the facts before us."' Although the court
demonstrated why the doctrine would fail as applied to the
easement in question, the court ultimately rejected application of
the changed conditions doctrine to terminate the easement.
The court in Sluyter discussed the ways in which an
easement may be terminated or extinguished - an issue not
previously addressed by the court.'' 6 Citing to the treatise, Powell
on Real Property, the court stated, "An easement can terminate
either by expiring in accordance with the intent of the parties
manifested in the creating transaction, or by being extinguished by
the course of events subsequent to its creation."11 7 The court
further provided a number of examples of termination by
extinguishment from the treatise, which include, "release and
abandonment . . . prescription and conveyance to a third person
having no actual or constructive notice of the easement's existence
. . . merger and estoppel . . . mortgage foreclosures, eminent
domain and tax sales."" 8
Although this case is instructive in providing methods in
which this jurisdiction allows for termination of easements, it is
unclear how the methods promulgated by the court would address
easements that no longer serve the purpose for which they were
originally created. Further, the lack of case law allowing for
114 Sluyter v. Hale Fireworks P'ship, 262 S.W.3d 154 (Ark. 2007)
15 Id at 516.
116 Id. at 514.
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application of the doctrine of changed conditions to easements and
the Supreme Court of Arkansas's rejection of the doctrine seem to
preclude application.
B. New York's Conservation Easement Statute
Rather than address the nature of conservation easements
and its treatment in the same manner as traditional easements, New
York's conservation easement statute provides a definition of
conservation easements that encompasses a number of servitudes.
In New York, a conservation easement is:
[A]n easement, covenant, restriction or other
interest in real property, created under and
subject to the provisions of this title . . . for
the purpose of preserving and maintaining
the scenic, open, historic, archaeological,
architectural, or natural condition, character,
significance or amenities of the real
property ... .119
At first glance, New York's definition of conservation
easements seems to incorporate modification and termination laws
in accordance with any of these servitudes. However, New York's
statute generally provides for modification and termination in
accordance with either its general real property law or a procedure
delineated in the statute (in the case of a state-owned conservation
easement). 120 The statute also provides different requirements for
modification and termination of conservation easements within the
Adirondack and Catskill Park areas and outside of these areas.121
The New York statute allows for modification and
extinguishment of conservation easements held by non-profit
conservation organizations through the following provision:
119 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303(1) (McKinney 2010).
120 See Id. § 49-0307.
121 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3(b)
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A conservation easement held by a not-for-profit
conservation organization may only be modified or
extinguished:
(a) as provided in the instrument creating the
easement; or
(b) in a proceeding pursuant to section nineteen
hundred fifty-one of the real property actions and
proceedings law; or
(c) upon the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. 122
The statute treats conservation easements held by public
bodies outside the Adirondack and Catskill parks in a similar
fashion, adding an additional provision allowing for
extinguishment or modification when required for a major utility
transmission facility. 123
The New York statute also allows for modification and
extinguishment of conservation easements held by a public body
inside the Adirondack or Catskill parks in the same way, unless the
conservation easement is held by the state or if land is required for
major utility transmission facility.124 In the case that conservation
easements are held by the state, the statute provides for a non-
adjudicatory public hearing where the public is given an
opportunity to determine whether the conservation easement, "can
no longer substantially accomplish its original purposes, or of the
purposes set forth [in the policy and statement of purpose section]
of this title."125  This section of the statute further imposes a
requirement on conservation easements held by the state or
required for major utility transmission facility that "such easement
shall be modified or extinguished only to the minimum extent
122 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(1) (MCKinney 2010).
123 Id. § 49-0307(2) (approval of a major utility transmission facility is
contingent on the facility receiving a certificate of environmental compatibility
and public need).
124 See Id. § 49-0307(3)(c) (a conservation easement held by a public body may
be extinguished, "unless such easement is held by the state, in a proceeding
pursuant to section nineteen hundred fifty-one of the real property actions and
proceedings law . ... ).
125 Id. § 49-0307(3)(d).
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necessary to accommodate the facility which is the subject of the
certificate of environmental compatibility and public need." 126
Therefore, except where the conservation easement is held
by a public body, inside the Adirondack and Catskill parks, the
New York statute allows for termination in accordance with
section 1951 of the real property actions and proceedings law. In
pertinent part, this provision states:
No restriction on the use of land created at
any time by covenant, promise or negative
easement ... shall be enforced ... if, at the
time the enforceability of the restriction is
brought in question, it appears that the
restriction is of no actual and substantial
benefit to the persons seeking its
enforcement or seeking a declaration or
determination of its enforceability, either
because the purpose of the restriction has
already been accomplished or, by reason of
changed conditions or other cause, its
purpose is not capable of accomplishment,
or for any other reason. 127
Upon finding that restrictions on the land are unenforceable
due to changed conditions, accomplishment of its purpose, or any
other reason, the covenant, promise or negative easement "shall be
completely extinguished upon payment, to the person or persons
who would otherwise be entitled to enforce it in the event of a
breach at the time of action, of such damages, if any, as such
person or persons will sustain from the extinguishment of the
restriction."128
The New York conservation easement statute then allows
for application of the doctrine of changed conditions to terminate
conservation easements by incorporating a provision of New
York's general real property law. This provision is applicable to
126 Id. § 49-0307(4).
127 N.Y. REAL PROP ACTS. LAW § 1951(1) (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added).
'
28 See Id. § 1951(2).
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terminate conservation easements unless the conservation
easement is held by the state inside the Adirondack or Catskill
Park or subject to other circumstances stated within the statute. 129
New York's conservation easement statute also allows for damages
in the event of termination due to changed conditions.
A number of cases further define the standards for
termination of covenants and promise or negative easement in
accordance with section 1951. New York courts apply a strict
standard for application of the doctrine of changed conditions
under section 1951, allowing for termination of a restriction where
"it is established that the change is such that the restriction has
become valueless to the property of the plaintiff and onerous to the
property of the defendant." 130  Courts will also invalidate
servitudes when enforcing a servitude would be oppressive to other
landowners in the area.131 In order to prove extinguishment of any
restriction on land, the party seeking extinguishment has the
burden of proving that the restriction has no actual and substantial
benefit because of changed conditions.' 32 In determining whether
the restriction has no actual or substantial benefit, courts look to
whether the property is capable of being put to the use required by
the restrictions.133
New York's conservation easement statute provides a
comprehensive framework for the treatment of conservation
easements. Although there are no cases in New York where a
court terminated a conservation easement, the statute provides
specific circumstances for the court to consider.
Additionally, the New York statute contains a provision
allowing for modification and termination, "as provided in the
129 Again, when held by non-profit organizations, conservation easements may
be subject to eminent domain and modification and termination language within
the conservation easement instrument. When held by a public body outside the
Adirondack or Catskill parks, conservation easements may additionally be
subject to requirements for major utility transmission facilities. See N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307 (McKinney 2010).
130 Hayes v. Leonard, 291 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968)
131 See McClure v. Leaycraft, 75 N.E. 961 (1905).
132 See Smith v. Sheppard, 754 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (finding
that defendants failed to meet their burden of proving that subdivision restriction
were of no actual and substantial benefit).
13 Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 52 N.Y.2d 253 (1981)
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instrument creating the easement." 134 This provision may allow
parties to a conservation easement to anticipate and prepare for
changes that may occur on the property encumbered by the
conservation easement. Provided the instrument's provisions
adequately address changed conditions, allowing such flexibility
may accomplish the same purpose for which the doctrine of
changed conditions is applied. Further, parties to a conservation
easement may provide alternative methods by which a
conservation easement may be modified to better accomplish its
initial purpose or provide for conservation benefits that are equally
beneficial.
Therefore, although it still remains unclear what standard a
court in New York would use in determining when a conservation
easement is no longer viable, New York's strict standard for
application of the doctrine of changed conditions may be
instructive. Unlike Arkansas' statute, the New York statute
comprehensively addresses the issue of conservation easements
that no longer serve their purpose while also allowing some
flexibility for parties to a conservation easement to provide their
own procedure within the instrument.
V. Conclusion
Conservation easements are an effective method of
preserving lands for a variety of purposes. However, as time
passes changes can occur that may cause a conservation easement
to no longer serve the purpose for which it was originally created.
A number of states fail to adequately address this issue in their
statutes, and may encounter issues when ineffective conservation
easements burden land. A comprehensive conservation easement
statute, such as the New York statute, adequately and effectively
addresses this issue. Where a state's decisional law is unclear
regarding changed circumstances, statutory language should
provide for application of the doctrine of changed conditions,
while also reserving the rights of parties to provide termination and
modification language within the conservation easement
instrument. The strict standard and caution with which courts
134 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307 (McKinney 2010).
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apply this doctrine sufficiently ensures that conservation easements
will continue to thrive unless they clearly fail to serve their
purpose. Further, statutes that allow for language within a
conservation easement instrument to determine how a conservation
easement should be modified or terminated may provide some
flexibility where parties can provide specific ways in which to
address changed conditions.

